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ARGENTINA'S ECONOMIc TROUBLES:
DEBT AND THE IMF
Fernando Avelar*
IN recent times, Argentina has had several economic troubles that
have all stemmed from a recession that began at the turn of the 21st
century, although some might argue that the economic troubles are
rooted even farther in the past. 2 Whatever the original cause, Argentina
is currently faced with new economic troubles and potential sanctions by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF).3 Argentina faces financial
trouble in the form of a highly devalued Argentine peso and lawsuits
against it for failure to pay outstanding bonds that were defaulted on in
2002.4 In addition to Argentina's financial troubles, Argentina has to
deal with warnings by the IMF for failure to provide adequate economic
reports and the IMF has implied that more severe sanctions are in line if
Argentina fails to comply. 5
I. 2002 DEBT DEFAULT STILL HAUNTS ARGENTINA
One of the more recent disputes that has arisen involving Argentina
deals with outstanding bonds that were defaulted on back in the early
2000s, which was the largest default by a sovereign nation in history.6
After the 2002 debt default, Argentina began the process of restructuring
its debt and refinanced most of it to a more manageable level and a steep
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discount.7 Approximately 93 percent of the bondholders agreed to swap
out the defaulted debt for new restructured debt.8 The 93 percent of
bondholders who accepted the restructured debt did so with a huge dis-
count to Argentina because the new bond swaps are only paying 25 to 29
percent of what the initial bonds paid.9 The holdouts who refused to take
the significant drop in payment and demanded a better payment sued
Argentina in U.S. courts at various times between 2009 and 2011.10
These lawsuits occurred because Argentina previously declined to pay
the holdouts any money." Argentina stated that it would only pay
money to those bondholders who accepted the new bond swaps and that
it would refuse to pay the holdouts. 1 2 The U.S. Second Circuit disagreed
with Argentina's position in NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, and ordered
Argentina to pay the holdout bondholders.' 3
In NML Capital, the Second Circuit focused on an equal treatment
provision (i.e., a "pari passu clause") that was written into the initial bond
contracts that obligated Argentina to treat all bondholders equally.14 Ac-
cording to Judge Parker from the Second Circuit, the equal treatment
provision "bars Argentina from discriminating against [bondholders']
bonds in favor of bonds issued in connection with the restructurings and
that Argentina violated that provision by ranking its payment obligations
on the defaulted debt below its obligations to the holders of its restruc-
tured debt."' 5 This case affirmed the lower court's ruling and enforced
the lower court's order by Judge Griesa, which called for $1.3 billion to be
deposited into an escrow account to be used to pay the holdouts.16 The
problem with this order, at least from Argentina's point of view, is that
the Argentine government is due to pay the restructured debt bondhold-
ers a minimum of $3.3 billion in principal and interest in December of
2012.17 Part of the order from Judge Griesa includes barring payments by
Argentina to the holders of restructured debt until payment of the $1.3
billion is made to the holdouts.' 8 If Argentina ultimately refuses to pay
the holdouts, the "U.S. courts could [potentially] embargo payments to
the creditors who accepted the debt restructurings," which would ulti-
7. Popper & Bases, supra note 4.
8. Id.
9. David Haskel, Argentina Defies U.S. Court Order to Pay $1.33B to American
Bondholders, INr'i Bus. & FIN. DAILY (BNA) (Nov. 1, 2012).
10. NML Capital, Ltd. v. Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 253 (2d Cir. 2012).
11. David Haskel, Second Circuit Orders Argentina to Pay $1.33 Billion to Bondhold-
ers, INT'L Bus. & FIN. DAILY (BNA) (Oct. 30, 2012).
12. Id.
13. NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 250.
14. Second Circuit Orders Argentina to Pay $1.33 Billion to Bondholders, supra note
11.
15. NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 250.
16. Id.; Popper & Bases, supra note 4.
17. Popper & Bases, supra note 4.
18. Katia Porzecanski, Argentina Rating Downgraded by Fitch on 'Probable' Default,
BLOOMBE RG (Nov. 27, 2012, 4:12 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-
27/argentina-downgraded-by-fitch-on-probable-default-from-ruling.html.
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mately cause a technical default.' 9 Another default by Argentina on its
bonds would likely cause economic and political turmoil in Argentina.
Argentina has not hidden its intent to refuse to pay the holdouts which
are mostly hedge funds any of the money owed under the defaulted
debt.2 0 Argentina has been using strong rhetoric against the hedge funds,
calling them "vulture funds" because of their investments in distressed
sovereign bonds. 21 After the court ruling, the Argentine Economic Min-
ister wrote on Twitter, "'[w]e shall not pay a single dollar to the vulture
funds.' "22
Even though no material decisions have been made by Argentina, it is
already feeling the pressure from the ruling, as Fitch Ratings has down-
graded Argentina's credit rating.23 Fitch Ratings cut Argentina's credit
rating down to CC, which means a "default by Argentina is probable." 24
The financial market responded to the credit rating decrease with a 13
percent decrease in Argentine dollar bonds.25
In October 2012, another event raised financial market concerns about
Argentina's economic well-being. The governor of Chaco, a province in
Argentina, paid U.S. dollar-denominated bonds in Argentine pesos. 26
This was frowned upon by the financial markets because of how devalued
the Argentine peso is compared to the U.S. dollar, and in effect, the prov-
ince paid less than what was owed because of the way the two currencies
are valued. 27 The exchange rate that was used to calculate the equivalent
of the U.S. dollar amount due in Argentine pesos was the official rate,
but the official rate does not take inflation into account. 28 The unofficial
rate, which does take inflation into account, is valued approximately 20
percent higher than the official rate. 29 On October 16, just a few weeks
after payment was made by the Chaco governor, the U.S. dollar sold for
$4.73 Argentine pesos when using the official rate, but the unofficial rate
was $6.20 Argentine pesos, which meant that the bondholders were
underpaid.30
Chaco was forced to pay in Argentine pesos because it was unable to
19. Popper & Bases, supra note 4.
20. Haskel, supra note 9.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Porzecanski, supra note 18.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Ken Parks, 2nd Update: Argentina's Chaco Province Pays Dollar Bonds in Pesos,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2012, 11:38 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-201210
08-708193.htmi.
27. See Argentina Vows to Honor Bond Maturity Of $200M Amid Market Fears of
Default, supra note 4.
28. Lucas Radicella, Chaco Announces it Will Convert its Debt to Pesos, ARG. INDEP.
(Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.argentinaindependent.com/currentaffairs/newsfromar-
gentina/chaco-announces-it-wiII-convert-its-debt-to-pesos/.
29. Id.
30. See Argentina Vows to Honor Bond Maturity Of $200M Amid Market Fears of
Default, supra note 4.
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purchase dollars at the regulated exchange market in Argentina.31 Ar-
gentine President Cristina Ferndndez de Kirchner has started to ration
hard currency and enact trade barriers to increase the central bank's in-
ternational currency reserves, which are used to pay the Argentine gov-
ernment's creditors. 32 Chaco's payment in pesos triggered a "massive
Argentine securities selloff" based on the fear that other Argentine prov-
inces would follow Chaco's lead.3 3 The securities selloff prompted the
Argentine Central Bank to issue a statement guaranteeing that all prov-
inces will be sold enough dollars to cover their debts notwithstanding the
restrictions in place.34
If the above is any indication as to how financial markets react to the
idea of Argentine default, then a technical default that could be triggered
by the NML Capital order would likely lead Argentina into a recession
like the one in the early 2000s.
II. IMF WARNS ARGENTINA
On September 17, 2012, the IMF board held a meeting to discuss
whether Argentina had met its obligation to report some of its economic
figures. 35 Argentina has been the target of increased criticism over the
years for alleged under-reporting of inflation and exaggerated economic
growth figures.36 As a member of the IMF, Argentina has a duty to make
accurate economic reports.37 But, as of September 17, the IMF was not
satisfied with the numbers reported by Argentina.38
Under Article IV of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, Section 3 allows
the IMF to survey the exchange rate policies of members. 39 In order for
the IMF to do this, the member country "shall provide the [IMF] with the
information necessary for such surveillance, and, when requested by the
[IMF], shall consult with it on the member's exchange rate policies." 40 In
addition, Section 5 of Article VIII gives the IMF the power to require
national data from a member country in order for the IMF to effectively
discharge its duties. 41
Despite the IMF requirements for its members, Argentina seems to
consistently provide inaccurate national data figures. For example, Ar-
gentina has reported its annual inflation rate at 10 percent, but private
31. Parks, supra note 26.
32. Id.
33. Argentina Vows to Honor Bond Maturity Of $200M Amid Market Fears of Default,
supra note 4.
34. Radicella, supra note 28.
35. IMF Warns Argentina, supra note 3.
36. Id.
37. Int'l Monetary Fund [IMF], Articles of Agreement, art. VIII, § 5 (2011), available at
http://www.imf.orglexternal/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf [hereinafter IMF Articles].
38. IMF Warns Argentina, supra note 3.
39. IMF Articles, supra note 37, art. IV, § 3.
40. Id.
41. Id. art. VIII, § 5.
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economists have said that it is actually 24 percent.42 The well-known
newspaper, THE ECONOMIST, published an article in February 2012 ex-
plaining why it would no longer publish the figures provided by Argen-
tina's National Institute of Statistics (INDEC). 43 THE ECONOMIST
explained that because the figures did not match reports by independent
economists, it would no longer rely on INDEC's numbers to provide data
about Argentina.44
Argentina's erroneous reporting dates back to 2007,45 which suspi-
ciously coincides with the time period in which Argentine President
Kirchner began to replace the personnel at INDEC in order to "improve
operations." 4 6 The government also fined several researchers as much as
500,000 Argentine pesos each for reporting inflation rates that were
above the official data.47 As a result of these figures being consistently
under-reported, the IMF warned Argentina that it had until December
17, 2012 to respond to the IMF's concerns about the data.48 The IMF
also stated that depending on Argentina's response on December 17, the
IMF Executive Board would review the issue and take any additional
steps necessary according to IMF procedures.49
The procedures that the IMF refers to are located in the IMF Articles
of Agreement. Under Article XXVI, when a member does not fulfill its
obligations under the Articles of Agreement, the IMF may declare the
violator ineligible to use the IMF's resources.50 The resources mentioned
refer to several different funds that are available to the member-countries
to use to overcome economic difficulties or to combat poverty levels in
developing countries.5 ' Article XXVI further provides ways to sanction
members who persist in their failure to fulfill their obligations, including
temporary suspension from the IMF 52 and expulsion from the IMF
completely.53
42. IMF's Christine Lagarde Says Argentina Faces 'Red Card,' BBC (Sept. 24, 2012,
8:47 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-19709273.




46. Sandrine Rastello & Eliana Raszewski, IMF to Put Argentina on Path to Censure




48. Press Release, Int'l Monetary Fund, Statement by the IMF Executive Board on
Argentina (Sept. 18, 2012).
49. Id.
50. IMF Articles, supra note 37, art. XXVI, § 2(a).
51. What We Do, INT'L MONEIARY FUNo, http://www.imf.org/external/about/
whatwedo.htm (last visited Jan. 2, 2013).
52. IMF Articles, supra note 37, art. XXVI, § 2(b).
53. Id. art. XXVI, § 2(c).
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III. MEDIA CONTROLS
The people of Argentina have not remained silent. Kirchner was re-
elected last year, but only by a narrow margin, receiving 54 percent of the
vote.54 On November 8, 2012, the people of Argentina showed their dis-
content when they took to the streets for massive demonstrations.55 The
demonstrators-estimated to be between 250,000 and 500,000 people-
rallied together to show their discontent with inflation, corruption, and
media control. 56
The ruling party's principal opposition, the Radical Civic Union, has
been weak for more than a decade since Argentina's recession in the
early 2000s.57 Because of this opposition vacancy, Argentina's media
conglomerate Clarin has taken its place as Kirchner's primary political
opponent.58 Kirchner has responded to Clarfn's opposition by pushing an
anti-monopoly media law against Clarin that will effectively result in the
dismantling of Clarin by requiring it to sell most of its broadcast stations
in addition to its Cablevision network.59
Clarin sought an injunction, challenging as unconstitutional a key arti-
cle in the media law that limits the number of media stations a company
can own. 60 The night before Clarfn's December 7 deadline to present a
plan to reduce its holdings, an Argentine court granted the injunction. 61
The injunction will suspend Clarin's deadline until a lower court rules on
whether the article in the media law is consistent with the Argentine con-
stitution.62 The agency representing the government in the action had
previously taken the position that the judges presiding over the case were
being impartial because they had accepted benefits from Clarfn and
sought to recuse them.63
Argentina's economic troubles are many, but all seem to relate to com-
mon factors, such as the debt default of the early 2000s. People outside
of Argentina have also increasingly pointed to Argentina's current ad-
ministration as borderline authoritarian because of how it has chosen to
54. Jonathan Gilbert, In Argentina, Social Unrest but No Political Alternative to Kirch-
ner, WORLD PoL. REV. (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/arti-
cles/12527/in-argentina-social-unrest-but-no-political-alternative-to-kirchner
(requires a subscription login).
55. Uki Goni & Jonathan Watts, Argentina Protests: Up to Half a Million Rally Against
Ferndndez de Kirchner, GUARDIAN (U.K.) (Nov. 9, 2012, 1:25 PM), http://www.
guardian.co.uk/world/2012/nov/09/argentiana-protests-rally-fernandez-kirchner.
56. Id.
57. Gilbert, supra note 54.
58. Id.
59. Grupo Clarin Wins Reprieve on Argentina Media Law, HUFFINCTON Posr (Dec. 6,
2012, 5:48 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20121206/1t-argentina-
media-law/?utm-hp ref=homepage&ir=homepage.
60. See id.; Jude Webber, Argentina Grants Clarin Late Reprieve, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 6,
2012, 12:36 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f506d986-3fc6-11e2-9f71-00144fea
bdcO.html#axzz2ELNJJoeO (requires a subscription login).
61. See Grupo Clarin Wins Reprieve on Argentina Media Law, supra note 59; Webber,
supra note 60.
62. Id.
63. Webber, supra note 60.
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handle some of the country's more pressing issues.64 The country's cur-
rent economic outlook is in a state of flux because many variables exist
that could ignite and cause another recession, which makes investing in
the country a risky situation. If Argentina is to overcome its financial
challenges, then it must start by meeting its legal responsibilities without
jeopardizing its integrity.
64. See Nick Ottens, Increasingly Authoritarian Kirchner Draws Mass Protests, Ar-
LANTIC SENTINEL (Nov. 12, 2012), http://atlanticsentinel.com/2012/11/increasingly-
authoritarian-kirchner-draws-mass-protests/; Kirchner's Landslide Could be Ar-
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